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Abstract
We present a method for evaluating the welfare of a decision maker,
based on observed choice data. Our method can be used whether or
not the observed choices are rational. In place of the usual prefer-
ence relation whose maximization induces the observations, we explain
choice as arising from a compromise among a set of simultaneously-
held, con￿ icting preference relations. We use these preference relations
as the basis to measure the decision maker￿ s welfare. In general our
method does not yield a unique set of explanatory preferences. Thus
we characterize all the explanatory combinations of preferences any
one of which could generate the data and compute bounds on wel-
fare changes based on this set. We show that unambigous evidence
of binary preference implies the existence of non-con￿ icted explana-
tions of choice. We show that stronger evidence for the preferability
of an alternative improves the status of this alternative at the welfare
bounds we develop. Our theory is consistent with context-dependent
choice patterns found in psychological experiments and o⁄ers a wel-
fare framework for evaluating changes in the set of opportunities in
the absence of rationality.
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three anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Caltech, Cambridge, Duke, Har-
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comments and suggestions.
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The use of observed choice behavior to make inferences about welfare is
one of the basic methods of economics. This classical "revealed preference"
method is based on the assumption that choice is rational. Our objective is to
extend this method to choice functions that are not rational, while following
its fundamental logic and objectives as closely as possible.
The standard economic procedure consists of three steps. First there is
given a set of choice problems, each of which is a subset of the set of all pos-
sible alternatives, and an observed choice made by a decision maker for each
problem. These problems and observations constitute the data. The data
may or may not be complete, as some possible choice problems may not be
included. It is assumed that the data contain no contradictions of rationality
￿no switches between observed choices when both remain available, and no
possibility for indirectly inferring that choice is self-contradictory, such as the
observation of cycles. The second step in the revealed preference methodol-
ogy is where the key theorem lies. Provided that the set of choice problems
is "rich enough", the theory tells us that a preference relation can be con-
structed with the property that the decision maker is behaving "as if" he or
she were optimizing it. When the data are not su¢ cient to de￿ne a unique
consistent preference relation, there is still a set of preferences relations that
can explain them.1 In all cases, revealed preference theory imagines that
the data is generated as if some preference relation were being optimized.
The third step uses this preference relation both to predict behavior "out
of sample" and to measure welfare.2 The latter presumes no divergence
between the "decision preference" that explains individual choices and "wel-
fare preference" that ranks outcomes according to the individual experienced
well-being.
The assumption of rationality is, however, not valid for many if not most
data sets that have been encountered. Tests of rationality on ordinary de-
mand data fail not because of large error terms but because the hypothesis
1Afriat￿ s procedure ￿nds one of them (Afriat (1967)). Mas-Colell (1978) gives an ap-
proximation result: The more data the smaller the set of preferences that remain consistent
with them.
2If there are multiple preference relations consistent with the data one should make
predictions based on each of them, and measure welfare using each of them. This procedure
is not followed in practice, however.
2is demonstrably false.3 Choice data in psychological experiments or in ￿eld-
based observations also contain internal inconsistencies and contradictions.
It is frequently the case that choice varies systematically with the context
in which it is made, refuting any internal consistency axiom that might be
applied. Revealed preference theory cannot be used as a basis for welfare
analysis because rationality cannot reasonably be assumed. There simply is
no single preference relation that generates the data, and thus there is no
preference relation that can serve as a basis for welfare measurement.4
In this paper we retain the objective of constructing a model for the
decision maker￿ s observed choice. We seek a model that works whether or
not these choices contain contradictions to rationality. Our strategy is to
look for a set of preference relations and a method for aggregating them that
work in the same "as if" sense that is employed in the standard theory. Our
interpretation of this set of preference relations is that they represent multiple
con￿ icting motivations that in￿ uence the decision maker￿ s choice. Thus we
model decision makers who are "con￿ icted" in that they simultaneously hold
multiple preferences over the alternatives. We want the data to tell us what
con￿ icts the decision maker might be experiencing; and we respect all these
con￿ icting preferences when evaluating welfare. It is in this sense that we
retain the central principle of choice-based welfare economics that has been
the hallmark of microeconomics.
Our central de￿nition is that of an "explanation": A set of preferences
and an aggregation method such that this method, applied to these prefer-
ences, reproduces the observed choice at every choice situation. We seek a
type of converse to social choice theory: We ask what forms of con￿ ict and
compromise can play the same "as if" role in an explanation of an irrational
choice pattern that a single preference relation plays for rational data in
revealed preference theory?5
We focus on aggregation rules that satisfy an intuitive monotonicity prop-
erty. We show that any choice function, no matter how irrational, can be
3See, for example, Deaton-Muellbauer (1980). Rationality in demand is tested via the
implication that under rational choice the Slutzsky substitution terms are symmetric.
4The need to extend welfare methods in economics to account for quasirational behav-
ior is discussed in Berheim-Rangel (2005), Gul-Pessendorfer (2005), and Koszegi-Rabin
(2007).
5Arrow￿ s Theorem tells us that any non-trivial aggregation of preferences must display
inconsistencies. This is usually taken as a negative, disappointing, result. For our theory,
however, this result is a source of strength.
3explained by our method using a typical monotonic aggregation rule. One
may construe this as a negative result in that the theory does not rule any-
thing out, a prior. However, although there are no logically-imposed limits
on the extent of the irrationality, highly irrational choice functions may re-
quire explanations with very strange sets of simultaneously held preferences.6
Alternatively, some behavior might require aggregation of preferences by un-
usual means. We show that ex-ante domain restrictions that rule out those
combinations of preferences or those aggregation procedures lead to testable
restrictions on the observable choice functions. We also show that there are
many explanations for any ￿nite data set. In particular, choices that are
consistent with rationality, will allow both an explanation based on a pure
preference and also others that put weight on multiple con￿ icting prefer-
ences. Thus, when evaluating welfare using our method, we obtain a range
of welfare measures due to the multiplicity of the explanations.
We introduce two welfare methods based on the set of explanations de-
rived from our theory of choice. The ordinal welfare method relies on choice
information alone and is a natural generalization of traditional welfare infer-
ence. It is based on a particular selection of explanations of a choice function,
those that are "non-con￿ icted" with respect to pairs of alternatives. Accord-
ing to this criterion, an alternative x is welfare preferred to y if there exists
an explanations that give full weight to the set of preferences on which x is
indeed preferred to y. We show that an explanation that is non-con￿ icted
with respect to this pair exists if and only if choices satisfy a limited consis-
tency property, pairwise coherence: y is never chosen at any situation where
both x and y are available.
The second method we introduce goes beyond the above results which
rely on only choice-based information. When some cardinal, "welfare infor-
mation" is available, we can derive stronger welfare conclusions even if all
explanations involve some con￿ ict. Further, the method allows explicitly for
a divergence between the consistency of choice and individual well-being, and
the welfare ranking is not determined by the existence of a non-con￿ icted ex-
planation. We obtain welfare inferences that are valid across all explanations
rather than a particular selection. The idea is, again, to parallel rationality-
based theory, which constructs cardinal measures of welfare based on assump-
6As mentioned above, revealed preference theory would display the same sort of mul-
tiplicity on ￿nite data sets.
4tions beyond the rationality of the choices observed.7 8We show that these
welfare bounds display a comparative static property that we call "evidence
monotonicity". No matter how irrational the choice function may be, if we
shift it in such a way that one alternative is unambiguously favored relative
to another alternative, then the favored alternative will gain at our welfare
bounds. Roughly speaking, if a policy maker is willing to say that smoking
is bad for someone who in some situations smokes, he must be willing to
conclude the same for someone who never smokes.
To our knowledge, this is the ￿rst paper to provide an explanation-
based general framework for the welfare analysis of non-rational choice data.
Other recent papers in "behavioral welfare economics" include Bernheim and
Rangel (2008) and Koszegi and Rabin (2007).9 Bernheim and Rangel (2008)
have independently proposed to use a welfare partial order based on pairwise
coherence. Hence, while our ordinal welfare method is consistent with their
proposal, there are important di⁄erences between their approach and ours,
as explained in more detail in section 4.2. In particular, the explanations
that arise from our theory of choice can be used to make inferences when
non-choice information is available.
The accumulation of laboratory and ￿eld-based evidence of irrationality
over the past twenty years has led other authors to explain choice by one of
two general methods. Neither of these methods is well adapted to welfare
analysis, which is our main goal. Both methods do o⁄er novel and interesting
postive models of irrational behavior. Our model does that as well.
The ￿rst class of models are "non-strategic, multiple-objective models".
7These assumptions might take several forms. One would use studies of brain func-
tion, other physiometric measures, or self-reported measures of satisfaction as the basis
for the cardinalization. Another might use further data on choices among lotteries, and
then, under the assumption that these choices ful￿ll an independence condition, would
de￿ne a cardinal utility from the observed risk preferences. Finally, if the choices are over
commodity bundles and one of the commodities, typically money, is assumed to enter pref-
erences in a quasi-linear form, then this commodity could be used to perform the scaling.
All of these methods thus would rely on additional axioms and assumptions to produce a
cardinalization.
8A recent paper that follows our methodology and introduces an explicit axiomatic
structure for aggregating cardinal motivations is Chambers and Hayashi (2008). The
objectives of this paper are somewhat di⁄erent from ours. It focuses on the explanations
of stochastic as well as non-stochastic choice functions.
9Koszegi and Rabin (2007) highlight the fact that, if inconsistencies in choice are gener-
ated by mistakes in judgement (e.g. the gambler￿ s fallacy), it might be possible to ammend
the traditional revealed preference approach by eliciting this mistakes.
5These models use multiple objectives, as we do, but do not apply the multiple
objectives simultaneously. 10
The second type of model are "strategic, multiple-objective models" that
assume that the multiple objectives are players in a game. The outcome of
the game generates the observed choice of the decision maker. Models of
irrational choice in this category recognize the existence of multiple con￿ ict-
ing preferences and impose a speci￿c strategic structure within which these
preferences interact. They take the nature of the multiple selves to be exoge-
nous. In our model, the multiple explanatory preferences and their relative
strengths are generated from the observations of choice. 11
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 o⁄ers an overview of our
results via two salient examples of irrational choice. Section 3 contains the
structure of the model and the main de￿nitions. Section 4 applies this struc-
ture when the only information available is ordinal in nature. Section 5
shows how the general methods of our paper can be extended when there
is additional, cardinal information available ￿information that does not di-
10There are three types of papers in this category. One uses sequential procedures, or
protocols, to resolve the con￿ ict among the preferences. For example, the alternatives
may be described by a list of attributes which could be considered in a ￿xed order to
eliminate or reorder the alternatives. From a welfare point of view it is not clear which of
the attributes is most salient ￿or, if preferences over attributes are to be combined, how
should they be weighted. Classic studies in this mode are Tversky (1972), Sha￿r (1993),
and Sha￿r-Simonson-Tversky (1993). A more recent theoretical paper along these lines is
Manzini-Mariotti (2007).
A second type of multiple objective theory partitions the decision problems into groups,
within each of which only one objective is operational. Recent papers include Kalai-
Rubinstein-Spiegler (2002) and Rubinstein-Salant (2007).
The third type of model uses a single objective function but multiple, context-dependent
constraints. Sen (1993) and the recent paper of Mandler-Manzini-Mariotti (2008) are
leading examples.
11When the nature of the decision problem has enough structure that one can identify
classical motivations, such as patience and impulsiveness, the strategy followed by these
strategically-based papers can pay handsome dividends. Our structure is more applicable
in general context-dependent situations where the nature of the alternatives is not known
a priori. Important papers in the strategic mold include Strotz (1956), Schelling (1984),
Bernheim-Rangel (2005), Gul-Pessendorfer (2001), and Fudenberg-Levine (2006).
Papers in the strategic category can obtain welfare conclusions if they treat the "players"
in a particular exogenous fashion. In Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (1998), priority is
given to the long-run self rather than any of the more impatient selves. See also O￿ Donahue
and Rabin (1999). The welfare conclusions of these papers are based on this assumption
of priority.
6rectly result from observations of choices and must therefore be pooled with
it. Section 6 is a brief conclusion. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Overview of the Results
We develop two examples that illustrate our methods and results in a cases
of considerable policy relevance. For simplicity, the examples consider three
outcomes or alternatives x;y and z and explanations based on linear aggre-
gation rules.12 The set of alternatives is denoted by X.
2.1 Retirement Funds and Cyclic Behavior
We consider a hypothetical choice situation involving retirement funds. In
most countries, pension funds are subject to signi￿cant regulation. In prac-
tice, these regulations a⁄ect the set of retirement portfolios available to indi-
viduals. Whether, and how much, a particular alternative is valued is usually
decided by revealed preference methods of economics. In the example below,
revealed preference methods cannot be used as our hypothetical consumer
does not display a pattern of choice behavior consistent with a single prefer-
ence.
We assume that each the retirement portfolios available to the consumer
corresponds to a lottery over outcomes. An outcome can be thought as a
monetary amount at the age of retirement. For simplicity each retirement
portfolio is described in terms of its expected return per dollar and risk. Typ-
ically, a low risk and return portfolio is always available either by requiring
private pension providers to o⁄er it or in the form of a de￿ned-bene￿t plan
such as social security in the United States.13 We use y to denote the riskless
and low return retirement portfolio. The availability of riskier options with
higher expected return is determined by government regulations. A common
legal requirement is to restrict the risk exposure of the funds o⁄ered to indi-
viduals by ￿nancial institutions or employers by limiting the type of private
12Linear aggregators are referred in the voting literature as scoring rules. The working
paper of this version focuses on scoring rules, a special case of the monotonic aggregators
considered hereafter.
13Chile was the ￿rst country to implement a broad private accounts retirement system
more than twenty years ago. Private providers are regulated and required to o⁄er pen-
sion funds with di⁄erent risk exposure. The safest fund holds mostly bonds and other
retirement portfolios hold di⁄erent mixes of bonds and securities.
7securities and positions that fund can invest in.14 We use x for a retirement
portfolio with intermediate risk and return, and z for the high risk and re-
turn portfolio. We assume that y is always available and that the policy
maker can make the one or both of the other portfolios available by allow-
ing providers to o⁄er a de￿ned-contribution plan with limited investments in
private securities.
We hypothesize a choice function that is not rational, but seems typical
of some fraction of the population. We will then give some examples of
explanations of this choice function, and we will use our ordinal welfare
method to evaluate the sign of the welfare change that would result from
a policy of allowing retirement funds that can invest in private securities.
Observed choice is assumed to follow a cyclical pattern consistent with the
￿ndings in Tversky (1969).15 We use c(A) to denote the choice when the set
of available alternatives is A:
c(fx;yg) = x
c(fy;zg) = y
c(fx;zg) = z
c(fx;y;zg) = x:
This choice function is not rational as there is no single preference consis-
tent with these choices. A typical rationale for this pattern of choice is the
following: If the safe and the intermediate return and risk are available, the
individual chooses the intermediate risk fund. The individual prefers the safe
option to the high risk option when these are the only options. If the safe op-
tion is not available, the individual is already taking some risk and choice is
dominated by the comparison between returns. Our model is consistent with
the view that the context in￿ uences the strength of each "motive" that might
in￿ uence the decision maker but we do not adhere to a speci￿c psychological
narrative of this process.
14There are other regulations that a⁄ect the expected bene￿ts and volatility of a re-
tirement fund. For example, in the United States, regulations to discourage employers
from o⁄ering 401(k) plans that invest heavily in the company￿ s own stock and are not
su¢ ciently diversi￿ed have been the subject of recent discussion.
15In this classic paper, subjects were presented with choices between pairs of lotteries.
Each lottery was de￿ned by two attributes, the probability of a "good state" and a prize
in the case this state is realized (if this state is not realized, the prize is zero). For all
treatments, a sizebale share of the subjects exhibited cycles.
8The theory of choice proposed in this paper can explain this pattern of
behavior and any other non-rational choice pattern (Theorem 1). It is based
on the aggregation of multiple preferences much like a voting procedure. In
our model, the decision maker is characterized by a distribution over the
preferences on X = fx;y;zg and an aggregation rule. This aggregation rule
can depend on the set of available alternatives, "the context". It summarizes
how the con￿ ict among the di⁄erent motivations is resolved. We adopt the
concise notation ￿ = a1a2a3 for a generic order ￿ such that a1 is preferred to
a2 and a2 is preferred to a3. With this notation the six strict preferences on
X are
￿1 = xyz; ￿2 = xzy
￿3 = yzx; ￿4 = yxz;
￿5 = zxy; ￿6 = zyx:
Each preferences is referred as a "motivation". A population of motivations
￿ 2 ￿6 is a probability distribution over these six orderings. For short, we
write ￿i = ￿(￿i) for each i = 1;2;:::;6, and
P6
i=1 ￿i = 1. The distribution
￿ identi￿es the preferences simultaneously held by the decision maker and
we interpret ￿i as the strength of motivation ￿i. The con￿ ict is resolved by
an aggregation rule v satisfying some reasonable restrictions, most notably
a form of monotonicity. For each ￿, these restrictions yield a "decision util-
ity function" gA(a;￿) that depends on the choice set A ￿ X of available
alternatives and gives a score to each alternative a such that choice can be
explained as if the decision-maker maximizes gA.16 For a linear aggregator
the choice-set dependent utility is given by
gA(a;￿) =
6 X
i=1
gA(a;￿i)￿i (1)
where gA(a;￿) = 1 if a is the maximizer of ￿ on A, gA(a;￿) = 0 if a is the
lowest ranked alternative in A for ￿, and gA(a;￿) is a number between 0 and
1 otherwise.17 In words, the score of an outcome is a weighted sum of the
strengths of motivations, where the weights are monotonic in the ranking of
the alternative. If X has three alternatives, each linear aggregator v is de￿ned
by a single free parameter ￿v 2 [0;1): Indeed, if A = X and ￿ = a1a2a3 then
16The details can be found in Green and Hojman (2008).
17This normalization is with no loss of generality.
9gX(a1;￿) = 1, gX(a2;￿) = ￿v and gX(a3;￿) = 0. A pair (￿;v) consisting
of a population and an aggregator explain the behavior c if, for each choice-
set A, c(A) maximizes gA(a;￿) across alternatives a 2 A. Equivalently,
gA(c(A);￿) ￿ gA(a;￿) for each a 2 A.
Suppose that the current system makes y -the safe option with low return-
the only available option. Consider the policy of creating personal accounts
and investment restrictions that make the intermediate risk retirement fund
x available. The contemplated change makes the available set fx;yg. Thus
the choice will shift from y = c(fyg) to x = c(fx;yg). Suppose that we had
￿eld or experimental evidence that the choice function is as described above.
What does our method tell us about the welfare e⁄ects of this policy option?
Even though the cyclic choice function c above is not rational, it exhibits
a form of limited consistency. Indeed, whenever x and y are available and
one of these alternatives is chosen, it is always x. We say that the choice
function c is pairwise coherent with respect to the pair (x;y). Note that c is
also pairwise coherent with respect to (y;z). However the choice function is
not pairwise coherent with respect to (x;z). According to Theorem 2, there
exist explanations that are not con￿ icted with respect to fx;yg. On the
other hand, all explanations place non-negligible positive weight on the sets
of motivations that prefer z to x and those that prefer x to z. Therefore, our
ordinal welfare method tells us that no matter how di⁄erent motivations are
weighted one cannot rule out the fact that the policy is welfare improving.
Now, depending on the way di⁄erent motivations are compared with each
other, and depending on which explanation is chosen, it is possible that
welfare will decrease as a result of the policy, even though the individual is
choosing x when y is available. This motivates the cardinal welfare method
illustrated below.
2.2 Sel￿sh and Other-regarding Motives in Con￿ ict
The clash between a "sel￿sh motivation" that aims to maximize material well-
being and motivations grounded on social norms of reciprocity is pervasive
in a number of social dilemmas.18 In this example there are three outcomes
18In economics, the idea of con￿ icted motives arising in social situations goes back to
at least Adam Smith (Ashraf et al. (2005)). The extensive literature on other-regarding
behavior has focused on rationalizations based on "social preferences". See Sobel (2005)
for a survey. The pattern of behavior in this example cannot be explained appealing to
any of the models as it is inconsistent with the maximization of a preference.
10x = (1;0); y = (3
4; 1
4) and z = (1
2; 1
2) each representing the split of one dollar.
Each alternative is a = (a1;a2) where a1 is what person 1 gets and a2 is what
person 2 gets, a1 +a2 = 1: Individual 1 chooses the outcome as in a dictator
game. We focus on this individual￿ s preferences and behavior.
A commonly observed choice behavior when outcomes have multiple at-
tributes is the "compromise e⁄ect". In this example, consider the following
choice pattern
c(fx;yg) = x
c(fx;zg) = x
c(fy;zg) = y
c(fx;y;zg) = y:
Hence, when confronted with any pair of outcomes the dictator chooses the
alternative that gives him or her the highest share. However, when all three
alternatives are available, the decision maker chooses the "compromise" al-
ternative. In line with Sha￿r, Simonsen, and Tversky (1993), this choice
pattern can be explained as follows: when the two extreme outcomes x and
z are available, the con￿ ict between sel￿sh and other-regarding motives be-
comes more salient and alternative y provides a "compromise" between these
con￿ icting reasons.
Once again, while we do not adhere to a speci￿c "story", our model
of choice is consistent with this view. Indeed, the choice function c, can be
explained by population that puts all the weight only on two motivations: the
"sel￿sh motivation" ￿1 = xyz that ranks outcomes with a higher split for the
individual rank higher and the "other-regarding" motivation ￿6 = zyx that
ranks outcomes with a more egalitarian split of the dollar are ranked higher.
For example, if the linear voting rule is such that ￿v > 1=2, any distribution
having ￿1 > 1=2, ￿1 < v and ￿1 + ￿6 = 1 explains c. There are many other
explanations of c. From Theorem 2, since c is not pairwise coherent with
respect to (x;y), any explanation must put weight both on motivations that
rank x over y and motivations that rank y over x. Hence, to establish which
of these alternatives is better for the individual with behavior, a cardinal
aggregation of all the explanatory preferences is necessary. In practice, this
exercise could be of relevance in trying to determine an optimal level of
redistribution or the welfare losses associated to redistribution.
The cardinal welfare theory developed in this paper postulates a cardi-
nal "welfare preference" W(￿;￿) on X for each explanatory distribution of
11motivations ￿ consistent with choice observations. The welfare measure of
outcome a 2 X for this distribution is
W(a;￿) =
6 X
i=1
u(a;￿i)￿i
where u(￿;￿i) is a utility function that represents ￿i. This measure aver-
ages the cardinal intensities associated to each motivation. The collection of
cardinal utilities u = fu(￿;￿i)g is referred as a cardinalization.
Suppose that after observing choice behavior c above, the analyst has
determined that outcome y is "welfare preferred" to x. This conclusion could
could be informed by "welfare information", e.g., a survey or other sources
of individual data indicating this preference. It could also be informed by
axiomatic restrictions on the set of cardinalizations. Suppose now that the
analyst observes a di⁄erent choice function e c given by
e c(fx;yg) = y
e c(fx;zg) = x
e c(fy;zg) = y
e c(fx;y;zg) = y:
Note that e c is consistent with rationality and it di⁄ers from c only on the
choice from fx;yg. This choice pattern can be explained by the pure motiva-
tion ￿4 = yxz, which obviously ranks the "compromise" alternative y better
than the "sel￿sh" alternative x. But there are other explanations of e c that
put weight on motivations that rank y over x. For example, the distribution
￿1 = 1=4 and ￿4 = 3=4 with any linear aggregation rule.
However, there is an unequivocal sense in which e c exhibits stronger choice
evidence for "y over x" than c does. Hence, if the analyst has concluded
that x is welfare preferred to y after observing c for then -all else equal,
it seems natural that the analyst should conclude that y is also preferable
for individuals that choose according to e c. This is precisely the content of
Theorem 3: more choice evidence in favor of "y over x" cannot lead to a
reversion of the welfare inference "y is better than x". This is a monotone
comparative statics result with respect to changes in the behavior observed
by the analyst. It relies on the monotonicity in ￿ of the both the aggregation
rule and the welfare functional, and imposes discipline on an analyst who
uses welfare information to make inferences. This discipline is based on
choice information alone.
12In Section 4, we illustrate another use of the cardinal welfare method.
Namely, if the analyst considers a speci￿c set of utility functions (as is often
the case in economics), it is possible to provide sharp conditions on the
cardinalization to determine whether a change in opportunities is bene￿cial
or detrimental for any explanation consistent with the data (Proposition 2).
This explicitly done for this example using a set of utility functions based on
Charness-Rabin (2002).
3 A Theory of Choice with Con￿ icting Moti-
vations
3.1 Observations and Explanations
The set of all possible outcomes or alternatives is X, which is assumed to be
￿nite. A typical outcome is a 2 X. A set of available alternatives A ￿ X
is a choice situation. An observation is a pair (a;A) where a is the choice
from A. We observe choices from a domain A of choice situations. Thus
the data we need to explain is a choice function c : A ! X summarizing all
the observations (c(A);A) for A 2 A. We will take A to be the set of all
non-empty subsets of A unless otherwise noted.19;20
We are interested in describing the behavior of an individual who simul-
taneously holds multiple motivations. We identify each motivation with a
preference on X. The set of all strict orders on X is denoted ￿ and ￿￿ is
the set of all probability distributions on ￿. An individual￿ s internal con-
￿ ict is identi￿ed with a distribution of preferences ￿ 2 ￿￿ is that describes
the simultaneously held preferences, as well as the strengths of each of these
motivations. In particular, ￿(￿) is the strength of preference ￿. We call
￿ a population of motivations or, for brevity, a population. An individual￿ s
choice behavior is to be explained as if the population ￿ were aggregated by
some ￿xed procedure, described by a correspondence v : ￿￿ ￿ A ! A. The
19One of the strengths of revealed preference theory is that it uses the structure of
the available sets, in particular the linear structure of consumers￿budget sets, to make
indirect inferences about preferences. As discussed later, in many economic environments
the structure of the outcome space leads to considerable simpli￿cation.
20Our model assumes that choice is single-valued. This assumption is not hard to
generalize but doing so would introduce considerable additional notation and complexity
that is not germane to the basic decision theoretic and welfare measurement issues.
13aggregator v can be thought as a voting or aggregation rule, which describes
how the potential con￿ ict among the multiple motivations is resolved at each
choice instance. If the population of motivations is ￿ and the available set of
alternatives is A then v(A;￿) ￿ A is the set of outcomes chosen.21 Further
speci￿cations and restrictions on the aggregation rules that we consider are
discussed shortly.
In sum, in our model, the decision maker is characterized by a pair (￿;v)
that induces a choice correspondence d(￿;v) : A ! A, where
d(￿;v)(A) = v(A;￿) for each A 2 A:
Given a choice function c we seek to explain c "as if" it were generated by
an individual who is characterized by a pair (￿;v).
De￿nition 1 [Explanation] An explanation of a choice function c is a pair
(￿;v) consisting of a population ￿ and a aggregation rule v such that c(A) 2
d(￿;v)(A) for all A 2 A. For a ￿xed aggregation rule v the set of populations
￿ such that (￿;v) is an explanation of c is denoted E(c;v).
If the aggregation rule were not restricted in some way any choice function
can be "explained", and any population ￿ can be part of that explanation.
One could simply let the aggregation rule ignore ￿ and chose c(A) whenever
the available set is A (i.e., de￿ne v(A;￿) ￿ c(A) regardless of ￿). Thus all
interesting conclusions of our model are driven by the restrictions that we
place on the form of the aggregation rule v.
Let us restrict the aggregation rule by requiring that v lie within a speci-
￿ed family of rules V . The smaller V is, the fewer explanations of c there will
be. Thus it becomes interesting to ask, for a particular family V , whether
a given choice rule c can be explained by any (￿;v) with v 2 V .22 In this
paper we restrict to explanations that are based on a particular family of
aggregators, monotonic rules.
21Notice that we do allow v to be set-valued. The voting rules we use in this paper,
however, have non-singleton values only on a null set of populations, and thus our speci-
￿cation of v as a correspondence is for technical correctness only, and not for the purpose
of allowing multi-valued choice at some observations.
22For example, if c actually satis￿es the axiom of revealed preference, and V includes
voting rules that respect unanimity (c(A) is the maximal element of ￿ on A whenever ￿ is
a point mass at ￿), then there will be a "rational explanation" of c. There may, however,
be other explanations of c as well.
143.2 Monotonic Aggregators
The family of monotonic aggregation rules V m is de￿ned by three intuitive
axioms: monotonicity, continuity and neutrality. We also require a mild
technical condition Pareto strictness, which greatly simpli￿es the statement
of the results. A formal statement of the axioms is in the Appendix, we
discuss their main content and implications below.
The key restriction satis￿ed by an aggregator v 2 V m is monotonicity.
Intuitively, monotonicity captures the idea that if a decision maker￿ s con￿ ict
is resolved in favor of choosing outcome a, this outcome will also be chosen
by a decision maker who uses the same aggregator but holds a distribution of
preferences that ranks the outcome "unequivocally better". More formally,
given an alternative a 2 X and a population ￿ 2 ￿￿, we can identify the set
of distributions M(a;￿) that can be obtained from ￿ by shifting mass from
some preference ￿ to preferences that rank a higher than ￿ while preserving
the relative order of other alternatives. Monotonicity says that if a 2 v(A;￿)
then a 2 v(A;￿) for all ￿ 2 M(a;￿). For illustration, suppose that X =
fx;y;zg and consider two decision makers characterized respectively by pairs
DM￿ = (￿;v) and DM￿ = (￿;v). Assume further that ￿(￿1) > 0, where
￿1 = xyz, and that ￿ is the same as ￿ except that some of the weight on ￿1
has been shifted to ￿4 = yxz. Note that ￿4 ranks y better than ￿1, as y is
promoted from second to ￿rst but the relative order of x and z is preserved.
In this case ￿ 2 M(y;￿) and, by monotonicity, if DM￿ chooses y at some
situation A then so does DM￿.
The continuity axiom requires the decision correspondence induced by
(v;￿) to be upper hemi-continuous in ￿. We view this as a mild technical re-
quirement with natural descriptive appeal: at all ￿ except those populations
at which v results in a multi-valued set of choices, nearby populations lead to
the same decision. Thus, individuals with a similar con￿ ict will typically have
similar choices. The third axiom, neutrality, captures the idea that the label
of the alternatives does not in￿ uence choice. Neutrality places a restriction
on how the aggregation rule depends on the distribution ￿ explained shortly.
In a related paper (Green and Hojman (2008)), we have shown that the
choice correspondence of a decision maker characterized by (￿;v) 2 ￿￿￿V m
can be "represented" by a family of choice-set-dependent decision utility
functions that satisfy properties we later use. To be precise for any monotonic
rule v 2 V m there exists a collection of functions fgAgA2A such that each
gA : A ￿ ￿￿ ! R satis￿es three properties:
15(M1) For any ￿xed ￿, gA(￿;￿) is a decision utility function:
d(v;￿)(A) = argmax
a2A
gA(a;￿)
(M2) gA(a;￿) is continuous, monotonic and di⁄erentiable in ￿.
Properties (M1) and (M2) rely exclusively on continuity and monotonic-
ity. Neutrality places additional restrictions on gA. It implies that the score
gA(a;￿) of alternative can only depend on the vector qaA(￿) = (q1
aA(￿);:::;q
jAj
aA(￿))
where qr
aA(￿) is the total weight on preferences that rank a in a position r
from the set A.23 Observe that qaA de￿nes a probability distribution on the
set of ranks f1;:::;jAjg. The corresponding cumulative distribution vector is
QaA(￿) = (Q1
aA(￿);:::;Q
jAj
aA(￿)), where Qr
aA(￿) =
Pr
j=1 q
j
aA(￿) is simply the
strength of motivations that rank a in position r or better.
(M3) gA(a;￿) = HA(QaA(￿)) for some increasing function HA : [0;1]jAj !
R.
Property (M3) follows from combining neutrality and monotonicity. Its
main implication is that if QaA(￿) ￿rst order stochastic dominates QbA(￿),24
then gA(a;￿) ￿ gA(b;￿). Roughly, if population ￿ puts more cumulative
weight on preferences that rank a than b then b cannot out-score a. We
point out that scoring rules correspond to the case in which the functions
HA are linear as in the motivating examples of Section 2.
(M4) If ￿(￿) > 0 only for preferences that rank a over b then gA(a;￿) >
gA(b;￿):
Monotonicity ensures that if ￿(￿) > 0 only for preferences that rank
a over b then gA(a;￿) ￿ gB(b;￿): Hence, (M4) captures a mild strictness
requirement, referred as Pareto-strictness: unanimity leads to a strict rank-
ing. In practice this requirement rules out an extreme set of rank-insensitive
monotonic rules.
23If r(a;A;￿) 2 f1;:::jAjg denotes the ranking of alternative a from set A under ordering
￿, we have that qr
aA(￿) =
P
￿:r(a;A;￿)=r ￿(￿), which is linear in ￿.
24That is, Qr
aA(￿) ￿ Qr
bA(￿) for all r 2 f1;:::;jAjg, with strict inequality for some r.
163.3 Explanations Based on Monotonic Rules
We use the properties (M1)-(M4) to characterize the choice functions c that
can be explained using a monotonic aggregation rule.
Theorem 1 For any choice function c and almost any monotonic aggrega-
tion rule v 2 V m there exists a full measure set of explanations E(c;v) based
on v.
The theorem says that any behavior, no matter how irrational, can be
explained using a model of con￿ icting motivations aggregated with a typical
monotonic rule. The result is both good and bad news. On the one hand, we
can use the model to conduct welfare inferences based on explanations for
any pattern of observed choices. On the other, the model cannot be rejected
using choice data alone.
There are two important classes of comments that should be noted at this
point. First, the range of experimentally observed choice patterns is indeed
very wide. In the case of a three alternatives, there are four logically possible
choice functions. Indeed, choices from pairs of alternatives can respect tran-
sitivity or exhibit cycles as in the retirement funds example in section 2. All
choice functions with a cycle are the equivalent modulo a permutation of the
alternatives. If choices from pairs respect transitivity, they will be consistent
with unique order. For example, a choice function such that
c(fx;yg) = x, c(y;zg) = y, and c(fx;zg) = z
is consistent with the ranking ￿1 = xyz. In this case, there are three possible
choice functions depending on the choice from the triple. If c(fx;y;zg) = x
then the choice is seemingly rational. If c(fx;y;zg) = y we say that c exhibits
second-place choice. The compromise e⁄ect illustrated by our example on
other-regarding behavior is an example of this type of behavior. Finally, if
c(fx;y;zg) = z we say that c exhibits third-place choice. Both experimental
and ￿eld-based studies have displayed all four of the logically possible choice
functions -seemingly rational, cyclic, second and third-place choice.25 Few
25The three patterns inconsistent with rational behavior have been documented by the
experimental psychology and decision-making literature that focuses on context e⁄ects in
choice with multi-attribute alternatives. The classic paper by Tversky (1969) and more
recent work by Roelofsma and Read (2000) show that cyclic choice can arise systematically.
There is also robust evidence of Second Place Choice, as shown by Simonson (1989). Third
17systematic studies with four or more alternatives have been made. Thus far,
there is no reason to believe that any particular family of choice functions
will never be seen in some data set. Therefore, the fact that our model can
accommodate choice functions of arbitrary complexity may well be a strength
rather than a weakness.
A second comment on this "full range" theorem relates to the support of
the set of explanatory populations. Introspection and psychological research
make "internal con￿ ict" an appealing idea. The theorem above places no
restriction on the extent of this con￿ ict. However as we discuss below, speci￿c
limitations on the nature of a decision maker￿ s internal con￿ ict will place
restrictions on the family of choice functions that can be generated. Thus
theories based on such limitations are testable using choice data alone.
The detailed proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Green and Hojman
(2008). We outline the main argument. Suppose that fgAgA2A is the collec-
tion of choice-set dependent utilities that represent v. Since v satis￿es neu-
trality, the population b ￿ that assigns equal weight to each motivation (i.e.,
b ￿(￿) = 1=￿ for each ￿) is "neutral": d(b ￿;v)(A) = A for all A. Equivalently,
each alternative gets the same score: gA(a;b ￿) = gA(b;b ￿) for all a;b 2 A. Now,
given a choice function c, a "strict" explanatory population ￿ must satisfy
gA(c(A);￿) > gA(a;￿) for all a 2 Anfc(A)g. The result is shown by con-
structing a family of strict explanations of c of the form ￿￿ = b ￿+￿
P
A2A ￿A;c
for some small ￿, i.e., a perturbation of the neutral b ￿: Each of the vectors ￿A;c
is chosen to break the inequality corresponding to choice set A without a⁄ect-
ing the scores at other subsets. This is done by ￿rst identifying the directions
that make ￿aA(￿;c) = gA(c(A);￿)￿gA(a;￿) increase at ￿ = b ￿ and, secondly,
by orthogonalizing these vectors. Since gA is di⁄erentiable, the directions of
increase are simply gradients of the form r￿￿aA(b ￿;c). The orthogonalization
process requires these vectors to be linearly independent, a condition that
can be shown to be satis￿ed by a typical monotonic aggregator.
place choice seems to be more elusive but Redelmeier and Sha￿r (1995) ￿nds this pattern.
The prevailing psychology theories include sequential decision-making procedures such as
elimination by aspects or theories based on context-dependent salience such as asymmetric
dominance. A more comprehensive theory called reason-based choice is proposed by Sha￿r,
Simonson, and Tversky (1993). This theory, based on the idea that the context determines
which among of many con￿ icting reasons prevails in a given choice situation, is close in
spirit to the model presented in this paper.
183.3.1 Domain Restrictions
Dual-System Explanations Recent research in behavioral and neuroe-
conomics has emphasized that departures from rationality could result from
the con￿ ict between two or more "systems" or motivations. For example,
in several domains of decision-making (e.g. choice under uncertainty, in-
tertemporal choice) non-rational choice is often attributed to the interaction
between a⁄ective and rational brain systems.26 The structure of internal
con￿ ict need not be based on biological systems, as illustrated by one of
our motivating examples, in which choice results from the con￿ ict between
sel￿sh and other-regarding motives. In our framework a "dual system" cor-
responds to a domain restriction on explanatory populations. Dual-system
explanations can be identi￿ed with set ￿dual = f￿ 2 ￿j ￿(￿) + ￿(￿0) = 1
for some ￿;￿0 2 ￿g. These are distributions that put weight on at most two
preferences, one for each "system".
Proposition 1 If jXj = 3 then dual-system explanations based on monotonic
rules can only explain (strictly) choice functions that are either seemingly ra-
tional or satisfy second-place choice (compromise e⁄ect). Cyclic choice and
third-place choice cannot be explained by dual-system explanations based on
monotonic rules.
Thus, if the analyst incorporates speci￿c assumptions about the nature
of the con￿ ict in a speci￿c decision context, the theory yields sharper pre-
dictions. In particular, in the case of three alternatives, cyclic choice and
third-place choice can only be generated by distributions that give positive
weight to three or more motivations. There is a sense in which these behav-
iors are more "irrational" than seemingly rational and second-place choice as
they can only be rationalized with "more con￿ icted" explanations.
Example 1 Sel￿sh and Other-regarding Motives in Con￿ict, continued
We apply Proposition 1 to the example introduced in section 2. Recall
that each x = (1;0); y = (3
4; 1
4) and z = (1
2; 1
2), represents a split of one dol-
lar. If we restrict the domain of explanations to distributions of preferences
over the "sel￿sh motivation" ￿s = xyz and the "other-regarding motivation"
￿o = zyx, there are two are four choice behaviors that can be explained using
26See for example, Kanheman (2003) and Camerer-Loewenstein-Prelec (2005).
19linear aggregation rules: seemingly rational choice consistent with ￿s, seem-
ingly rational choice consistent with ￿o, and two instances of second-place
choice. Both second-place choice behaviors have the "compromise alterna-
tive" y chosen from the triple and in one case choices from the pairs are
consistent with ￿s while in the other they are consistent with ￿o.
"More is Better" and Natural Explanations We have considered a
general ￿nite space of alternatives X. In many economic applications X
has a structure that imposes natural restrictions on the set of explanatory
preferences. For example, in choosing between di⁄erent cars, the decision-
maker may consider the miles per gallon of gas, safety indicators, and color
of each option. If mileage per gallon and safety are represented as numbers,
each of the attributes admits a natural order (color perhaps not). In the
case of consumption bundles, the amount of each commodity is similarly
ordered in the usual "more is better" fashion. In each of these examples,
an alternative can be described by a m￿component vector x = (x1;:::;xm)
of m attributes or commodities, so that X = ￿m
i=Xi, and there exists a
(maximal) subset of attributes O ￿ f1;:::;mg such that for each i 2 O,
the space Xi has a linear order >i. These orders induce a partial order
> on the space X: if x > y if xi >i yi for all i 2 O and xi = yi for
all i = 2 O. The partial order > has the usual interpretation of "more is
better". Only preferences in the set ￿o = f￿ 2 ￿jx > y ) x￿yg rank
alternatives consistent with the order >, and it is natural to seek explanations
that put weight exclusively on preferences in ￿o: If the domain of populations
is restricted to ￿o = f￿ 2 ￿￿j￿(￿) > 0 ) ￿ 2 ￿og, it can be shown that
using a typical monotonic rule a choice function c can be explained only if
it is consistent with the partial order > on X. Thus, a choice function such
that, for some A, c(A) is dominated under > by some other alternative in A
cannot be explained.
Consistent Aggregators Restricting the set of aggregators can also lead
to sharper predictions. Property (M3) places no constraint on the function
HA across subsets. For illustration, suppose that X = fx;y;z;wg and let A =
fx;y;zg. Suppose that gA(a;￿) = Q1
aA(￿), i.e., the score of an alternative
is simply the weight of those preferences that rank it ￿rst. Instead, if X
is available suppose that gX(a;￿) = Q3
aX(￿), i.e., the scoring function gives
equal importance to preferences that do not rank the alternative last out the
20four available. Unless we want to allow the aggregation of preferences to vary
arbitrarily across choice situations, it might be reasonable to impose some
consistency on the aggregator.
An example of "consistent aggregator" is the Borda rule, which is de￿ned
by scoring functions of the form gA(a;￿) = 1
jAj
P
j Q
j
aA(￿). It can be shown
that the score of an alternative a at set A is the average of the score this
alternative gets in each subset of A of size jAj ￿ 1 and thus, by recursion,
it is an average of the score a obtains in pairwise contests against each of
the other alternatives in the choice set. The tight connection between scores
across di⁄erent choice situations restricts the choice functions that can be
explained using this type of aggregator. In particular, if jXj = 3 third-place
choice cannot be explained by using Borda aggregators.27
4 Ordinal Welfare Inference
Given a choice function c observed over a domain of choice instances A,
and a family of preference aggregators V , the theory of choice introduced
in the previous section delivers a set E(c;V ) = [v2VE(c;v) of explanatory
distributions of preferences. For any distribution ￿ 2 E(c;V ) there exists an
aggregation procedure v 2 V such that (￿;v) explains the choice function.
The set E(c;V ) can be interpreted as the set of con￿ icted motivations that,
according to our of choice model, are consistent with the the choice data
summarized by c. In this section we introduce an ordinal welfare method
based on the set of explanatory preferences.28 As argued below, the method
generalizes traditional welfare measurement.
Formally, we approach welfare measurement in the following sequence of
steps:
(W1) Given a domain A of choice instances, observe fc(A)gA2A :
(W2) Given a family of aggregation rules V compute the set of populations
E(c;V ) that can be part of an explanation.
27More generally, a Borda aggregator cannot explain a choice function c such that for
some A there are alternatives l;w satisfying (i) l = 2 c(fl;ag) for all a 2 Anflg, and (ii)
l = 2 c(fw;ag) for all a 2 Anfwg.
28Our analysis implicitly assumes that the speci￿c aggregator used by the decision maker
is not known. On the other hand, we are willing to restrict the aggregator to a family of
rules V .
21(W3) Given a change in the set of opportunities from A to B, test whether
there exists ￿ 2 E(c;V ) such that c(A) and c(B) are ranked in the
same way by all ￿ for which ￿(￿) > 0:
It is convenient to introduce some terminology to establish the connection
of the method implied by (W1)-(W3) with traditional welfare economics and
recent attempts to extend welfare analysis to non-rational choice.
De￿nition 2 (Non-co￿ icted Explanation) A choice function c admits
an explanation based on V that is non-con￿icted with respect to the pair
(x;y) 2 X2, if there exists ￿ 2 E(c;V ) such that each preference that is
given strictly positive weight ranks x better than y.
An explanatory population is non-con￿ icted with respect to a pair if the
preferences in its support are unanimous with respect the ranking of that
pair. For each choice function c, the set of aggregation rules V induces a
binary relation Rc;V based on the existence of non-con￿ icted explanations,
the ordinal welfare relation:
De￿nition 3 (Ordinal Welfare Relation) xRc;Vy if and only if c admits
an explanation based on V that is non-con￿icted with respect to (x;y).
Step (W3) above postulates the use of Rc;V for welfare inference. Before
providing a characterization of the ordinal welfare relation for the case of
monotonic aggregators (V = V m) some remarks are in place.
We start by observing that traditional welfare analysis requires c to satisfy
WARP. If so, it is possible to infer a preference relation to be used for welfare
inference. Our method places no restriction on observed choices; any choice
function is admissible. In general, Rc;V is a partial order (see below) but if c
satis￿es WARP then Rc;V is the usual "revealed" preference.
Second, the method summarized by Rc;V relies on the existence of a non-
con￿ icted explanation with respect to pairs of alternatives. This "selection"
might be viewed as a weakness as there will typically be other explanations
of the behavior that are indeed con￿ icted. We return to this important
issue below. Here we simply note that the selection of the non-con￿ icted
explanation, if there is one, is a natural generalization of traditional welfare
inference. Even a choice function that satis￿es WARP will admit multiple
explanations, as illustrated in our second motivating example. Only one of
22these explanations is a "pure" preference, a point mass on the preference
used in traditional welfare analysis.
Third, the welfare inferences made using Rc;V are both based on choice
data and the the model or explanations used to rationalize this data. The
method can be easily extended to any theory of behavior based on multiple
preferences or rationales.29
In principle, it is not obvious how to construct Rc;V as it requires testing
the existence of non-con￿ icted explanations for each pair of alternatives. We
provide a complete characterization of Rc;V in terms of c alone for the case
of explanations based on monotonic aggregators (V = V m).
4.1 Pairwise Coherence and Ordinal Welfare Inference
We assume that V = V m. Our characterization of Rc;V m relies on a concept
of limited consistency:
De￿nition 4 (Pairwise Coherence) A choice function c is said to be pair-
wise coherent with respect to the ordered pair (x;y) 2 X2 if for any A that
contains both x and y we have that c(A) 2 fx;yg ) c(A) = x.
Pairwise coherence is a version of the consistency axioms of rational choice
theory valid for particular pair rather than all pairs.30
Each choice function c induces a binary relation Rc on the space of out-
comes X based on pairwise coherence, the choice order:31
De￿nition 5 (Choice Order) xRcy if and only if c is pairwise coherent
with respect to (x;y).
29For example, in Kalai-Rubinstein-Spiegler (2002), choice functions are rationalized by
set of preferences on X and a partition such that each preference "operates" on an element
of the partition. A non-con￿ cited explanation requires unanimity among these preferences
for a given pair.
30The choice functions compatible with rational choice are those satisfying Houtakker￿ s
axiom. Let a;a0 2 X and caa0 = fA 2 Aj c(A) 2 fa;a0gg. One version of this axiom is
as follows: For any pair of alternatives a and a0, either a 2 c(A) for all A 2 caa0 or else
a0 2 c(A) for all A 2 caa0. If c(A) is a singleton for all A 2 caa0, one can replace "2"
with "=". Hence, the axiom just says that for c there are no "preference reversals": ignor-
ing indi⁄erences, either a is "revealed preferred" to a0 or vice-versa. Pairwise coherence
establishes the same for a particular pair a = x and a0 = y.
31Bernheim and Rangel [2008] show that Rc is a partial order: it is re￿ exive, antisym-
metric, and transitive.
23Consider any monotonic rule v. Monotonicity implies that given any
population ￿ that is non-con￿ icted with respect to (x;y), the choice corre-
spondence d(￿;v) will be pairwise coherent with respect to (x;y). It follows
that if xRc;Vy then xRcy. The following theorem shows pairwise coherence
is not only necessary but su¢ cient for the existence of a non-con￿ icted ex-
planation.
Theorem 2 A choice function c admits an explanation that is non-con￿icted
with respect to (x;y) if and only if c is pairwise coherent with respect to (x;y).
That is, Rc;V m = Rc.
Theorem 2 says that if c is such that x is always chosen over y, no mat-
ter how crazy the choice pattern c, there is always an explanation of the
behavior that involves motivations which are not con￿ icted with respect to
this pair of alternatives. It is also worth to point out that if c is pairwise
coherent with respect to (x;y) there is an upper bound of 1=2 on the strength
of motivations that prefer y over x.32 Conversely, if c is not pairwise coher-
ent with respect to (x;y) there exists no explanation ￿ 2 E(c;v) that puts
weight exclusively on motivations that prefer one alternative over the other.
That is, whenever there is con￿ icting direct evidence about the preference
between two alternatives, all explanations will indicate a genuine con￿ ict in
the motivations. Note also that, since Rc;V m = Rc, Rc;V m is a partial order.
4.2 Discussion
There are two approaches to welfare analysis in economics. The ￿rst approach
is to postulate choice as the only source for normative analysis. This view,
sometimes referred as the "libertarian principle" is endorsed by Bernheim
and Rangel (2008). Formally, it involves using the partial order Rc induced
by the choice function and pairwise coherence for ordinal welfare inference.
According to this view, "revealed preference" is really "revealed choice", and
normative analysis is tautologically identi￿ed with choice. No explanation
of behavior is needed to conduct welfare analysis. This approach implicitly
assumes that choice in itself carries a valid notion of well-being. Ultimately,
this approach is limited by the consistency of behavior.
The second approach, is to base normative analysis on explanations of be-
havior. More precisely, an explanation-based approach to normative analysis
32This is immediately inferred from c(fx;yg) = x.
24requires de￿ning both a theory of choice and theory of welfare based on the
explanations o⁄ered by the theory of choice. In our framework, explanations
derive from theory of choice based on the aggregation of multiple prefer-
ences. The ordinal welfare method we propose is based on the existence
of non-con￿ icted explanations with respect to a pair of alternatives. The
method induces a binary relation RV;c on the space of alternatives: "x over
y" if there exists a non-con￿ icted explanation. Theorem 1 shows that this
partial order is the same as Rc.33 A central di⁄erence between our framework
and Bernheim and Rangel (2008) is that our starting point are explanations
of the observed behavior. If we insist on the "libertarian principle" as the
appropriate normative benchmark for welfare analysis, our theory of choice
and ordinal welfare method can be used as a justi￿cation. However, there
might be fundamental reasons to reject the libertarian principle as an ade-
quate baseline. A strength of our theory is that it can be accommodated to
address these issues.
Indeed, there are at least two important reasons to go beyond the ordinal
welfare proposed in this section. First, as argued by Sen (1977, 2002) and
more recently by Kanheman34, the consistency of choice as captured Rc may
not re￿ ect an individual￿ s well-being as choices need not re￿ ect motives that
are central to welfare. An individual could make choices that are detrimen-
tal to her well-being for a number of reasons.35 For example, an addict can
consistently choose to consume cocaine whenever available. The libertarian
principle, would suggest that an addict is willing to pay to have cocaine le-
galized. Our theory allows for non-con￿ icted explanations that support the
latter conclusion but it also allows for other explanations consistent with
the idea that the preferences aligned with the addict￿ s well-being are "out-
voted" in the decision process by self-destructive motivations. Second, the
construction of Rc;V is based on a particular selection of explanatory dis-
tributions. Re￿ning the set of explanations in our framework is certainly
desirable to achieve tighter welfare conclusions. At the same time, it seems
important to derive welfare conclusions that are valid "uniformly" across all
33Using this order for welfare analysis was independently proposed by Bernheim and
Rangel (2008).
34See, for example, Kanheman, Sarin,and Wakker (1997).
35Lack of lack of self-command and self-destructive tendencies is only one source of
departure between choice and welfare. Mistakes grounded on bounded cognition is another
one. Sen emphasizes choice may result from a compromise between multiple objectives,
only one of which could be individual well-being .
25the explanations consistent with an observed behavior.
In the following section we propose a cardinal welfare method that at-
tempts to address these issues. The method is based on the same set of
explanations that result from our theory of choice. However, we allow for
a divergence between choice and welfare and postulate a welfare preference
that is based on the aggregation of explanatory preferences. This aggregation
is di⁄erent than the one that explains choice and requires the analyst to use
non-choice information.
5 Cardinal Welfare Analysis
In this section we expand the scope of our explanation-based approach to
welfare analysis by introducing additional information that the policy maker
or analyst may possess. This additional information, welfare information, is
relevant to the individual￿ s welfare and may not be re￿ ected in choice. Thus,
in this section, our approach is "welfarist" in that it introduces an explicit
distinction between observable choice behavior and welfare maximization,
and it accepts the latter as the "true" objective that should be used by a
policy maker, if possible. For the moment, we defer further discussion of the
nature of this additional welfare-relevant information.
The cardinal method we propose makes three key assumptions. First,
there is a welfare preference for each individual. Second, the analyst or pol-
icy maker has access to welfare information that allows to partially infer this
preference. Third, the welfare preference is conceived as a cardinal aggrega-
tion of the same ordinal preferences that explain behavior.
In concrete, a cardinalization u : X ￿ ￿ ! R is a real-valued function
that, for each ￿ 2 ￿ gives a welfare-relevant numerical evaluation of each
a 2 X. That is, u(a;￿) is the preference intensity of a for motivation ￿. The
welfare functional W u : X ￿ ￿￿ ! R associated to the cardinalization u
describes the cardinal scale of preference, relevant to welfare measurement,
that is associated with each distribution over the motivations. We will assume
that W u linearly aggregates the utility scales of each motivation ￿, weighting
them by their strengths ￿(￿). Thus,
W
u(a;￿) =
P
￿2￿
u(a;￿)￿(￿):
We make use of the linear structure of W u is Proposition 2 but Theorem 3
26relies on a the same type of monotonicity property assumed for the choice
aggregators. In particular, the welfare change
￿W
u(a;b;￿) ￿ W
u(a;￿) ￿ W
u(b;￿)
increases as we shift mass from motivations that rank b over a to motivations
that rank a over b.36
In an ideal situation the policy maker would know exactly what the wel-
fare maximizing alternative is. The policy maker might also be able to provide
an accurate quantitative scaling of all possible alternatives, useful when the
welfare maximizing alternative is not available. Indeed in the ideal situation
the policy maker could dispense with analysis altogether and simply give the
individual the welfare maximizing alternative.37 In the real world, however,
full information about the true welfare maximizing choice is not available to
the policy maker. Some information may be available to the policy maker
but this information is incomplete in two respects. First, observing choice
information c provides some guidance about con￿ icting ordinal preferences,
but there are in general multiple ordinal preferences consistent with any one
choice pattern. The analyst just knows that ￿ 2 E(c;V ). In addition, there
may be less than full information available about the cardinal intensity with
which these preferences in￿ uence welfare. The welfare information of the
policy maker will be described by a set of cardinalizations U. The meaning is
that the policy maker knows that u 2 U but does not know precisely which
u is the correct one. For example, a survey may reveal that all individuals
that individuals with choices c prefer a to b. This implicitly restricts the
set of cardinalizations to U = fuj￿W u(a;b;￿) ￿ 0 for all ￿ 2 E(c;V )g:38
Improvements in the policy maker￿ s information can be modelled by making
the set of cardinalizations smaller.
36We also note that the results presented below extend to welfare measures that depend
on the choice set, as long as this property holds. A linear example of a choice-set dependent
welfare measure is Wu(a;A;￿) =
P
￿2￿
u(a;A;￿)￿(￿): We have sacri￿ced generality to
simplify the presentation but do not deny the possibility that individual welfare depend
on the set of alternatives available.
37As suggested by Sunstein and Thaler [2008], in many situations individuals can be
"nudged" to make choices that the policy maker has judged to be welfare improving.
38A richer survey could reveal that a is preferred to b for individuals with behaviors
c1;:::;ck. In this case, the implied set of cardinalizations is U = fuj￿Wu(a;b;￿) ￿ 0 for
all ￿ 2 [k
j=1E(cj;V )g:
27In sum, the information available to the policy maker is summarized by
U and c. Given a family of aggregation rules V the analyst computes the
set of populations E(c;V ) = [v2VE(c;v) that can be part of an explanation.
For each (u;￿) 2 U ￿E(c;V ) and each A 2 A compute the welfare measure
at A based on ￿:
W
u(c(A);￿) =
P
￿2￿
u(c(A);￿)￿(￿) (2)
We are interested in evaluating, and in bounding, the welfare changes that
may occur as the available set A changes. If A changes to A0 but c(A) = c(A0)
then our consequentialist viewpoint has already ruled out any change in
welfare, no matter what (u;￿) 2 U ￿ E(c;V ) might be. Therefore we focus
on pairs of available sets, (A;A0) where c(A) 6= c(A0), which we call choice-
varying changes in the opportunities. The welfare change induced by such
changes is
￿W(A
0;A;￿;c;u) ￿ W
u(c(A
0);￿) ￿ W
u(c(A);￿)
This expression is the object of our analysis. All the questions we ask are
related to bounds that can be placed on this di⁄erence, and to changes in
these bounds that occur in response to new or revised information -changes
in c or U- that the policy maker might obtain. Indeed, given c and u, we can
compute
￿W
max(A
0;A;c;u;V ) ￿ max
￿2E(c;V )
￿W(A
0;A;￿;c;u)
and
￿W
min(A
0;A;c;u;V ) ￿ min
￿2E(c;V )
￿W(A
0;A;￿;c;u)
These expressions represent the best and worst-case scenarios for evaluat-
ing the observed change in choice from y = c(A) to x = c(A0) given the
observed choice function and the cardinalization. ￿W min(A0;A;c;u;V ) ￿ 0
indicates that the change from A to A0 is bene￿cial for any explanatory
population, con￿ icted or not with respect to the pair (x;y). Similarly,
￿W max(A0;A;c;u;V ) ￿ 0 indicates a detrimental change in opportunities
for any explanation consistent with choice data.
First, holding c ￿xed we identify the set of cardinalizations that yield
clear welfare implications for the comparison of x and y: Our results address
28the type of welfare relevant information that the policy maker might need
to gather in order to reach an unambiguous welfare statement. Next, we
examine, for a ￿xed u 2 U, a change in the observed c that favors x over
y. Such a change will alter the set of explanatory populations. We show that
over the range of this explanatory set the welfare evaluations of x rise relative
to y, in a sense that we make precise.
5.1 Uniform Welfare Improvements
Suppose the analyst observed c and consider a change in opportunities from
A to A0 that changes choice from y = c(A) to x = c(A0). What are the re-
strictions on the cardinalization u that ensure this change is either bene￿cial
or harmful for all explanations consistent with choice data? We show that
although the explanations of c may all be con￿ icted as between x and y,
as may necessarily be the case according to Theorem 2, it may still be true
that a de￿nitive welfare conclusion is possible because of the nature of the
cardinalization.
Since the welfare measure is an average of utilities across the motivations,
the sign of a welfare change depends crucially on two magnitudes: the relative
strength of motivations favored by the expansion vis a vis those hurt by
it, and the magnitude of the gains and losses associated to each group of
motivations. We introduce some notation to quantify these magnitudes. For
each pair of alternatives x;y 2 X, x 6= y, let ￿xy = f￿ 2 ￿ j x￿yg. This
is the set of motivations that gain if the outcome changes from y to x. The
set of motivations that are hurt by this change is ￿yx = ￿￿￿xy. Consider
an explanation ￿ of c, and let ￿(x;y;￿) =
P
￿2￿xy ￿(￿) and ￿(y;x;￿) = P
￿2￿yx ￿(￿) = 1 ￿ ￿(x;y;￿). These numbers represent the weight on the
motivations that gain and lose if the outcome changes from y to x. De￿ne
the ratio
￿(x;y;￿) =
￿(x;y;￿)
￿(y;x;￿)
=
￿(x;y;￿)
1 ￿ ￿(x;y;￿)
:
29The upper and a lower bounds of this ratio across all motivations are39
￿
min(x;y;c;V ) = inf
￿2E(c;V )
￿(x;y;￿) and ￿
max(x;y;c;V ) = sup
￿2E(c;V )
￿(x;y;￿).
For each cardinalization u 2 U and each pair of alternatives x;y 2 X,
x 6= y, let
L(x;y;u) =
max
￿2￿yx
ju(x;￿) ￿ u(y;￿)j
min
￿2￿xy
u(x;￿) ￿ u(y;￿)
and l(x;y;u) =
min
￿2￿yx
ju(x;￿) ￿ u(y;￿)j
max
￿2￿xy
u(x;￿) ￿ u(y;￿)
:
These numbers are extremal measures of the welfare change for motivations
that lose or gain if the outcome changes from y to x. L(x;y;u) is upper bound
for this welfare loss across those motivations hurt by the change compared to
the smallest possible gain across motivations that bene￿t from it. Conversely,
l(x;y;u) is a lower bound as it compares the lowest possible loss with the
largest possible gain.
Fix a cardinalization u, a choice rule c, and consider a choice-varying
change in opportunities from A to A0. Then, if x = c(A0) and y = c(A):
Proposition 2
(i) If L(x;y;u) ￿ ￿min(x;y;c;V ) then ￿W min(A0;A;c;u;V ) ￿ 0;
(ii) If l(x;y;u) ￿ ￿max(x;y;c;V ) then ￿W max(x;y;c;u;V ) ￿ 0
Proposition 2 (i) provides a su¢ cient condition to check whether or not a
change in opportunities is surely bene￿cial for a given choice function c and
the welfare functional associated to the cardinalization u. The condition in
(i) says that the change is surely bene￿cial if L, an upper bound on the loss
of a motivation hurt by the expansion relative to the gain from a motivation
that bene￿ts from it, is small relative to ￿min - a lower bound on the strength
of motivations that bene￿t relative to and those that lose. Note that ￿min is
independent of u and L is independent of c. Similarly, condition (ii) provides
a su¢ cient condition for the change is detrimental.40
39Maximizing (minimizing) ￿(x;y;￿) over ￿ is equivalent to maximizing (minimizing)
￿(x;y;￿) which is linear in ￿. In the working paper version we show that if V is the set
of linear aggregators this problem is equivalent to solving several linear programs. The
bounds are explicitly provided for any choice function and change in opportunities for the
case of three alternatives.
40In the working paper version we show that these conditions are tight.
30Example 2 Sel￿sh and Other-regarding Motives in Con￿ict, continued
In this example we apply the uniform bounds test above. For illustration,
we consider the restriction to "dual system" explanations that put weight on
the "sel￿sh" motivation ￿s = xyz and/or the "other-regarding" motivation
￿o = zyx. The cardinalization is derived from a parameterized family of
utility functions based on Charness-Rabin (2002). Let ￿ = (￿;￿) 2 R2
+ and
consider the two-parameter family of utility functions
u(a;￿) = a1 + ￿a2 + ￿ minfa1;a2g: (3)
Utility increases with the individual￿ s own material payo⁄ a1, the other per-
son￿ s material payo⁄ a2 (at rate ￿), and the last term represents a concern
for equity. We restrict ourselves to the case in which u is increasing in a1 for
any split such that a1 ￿ a2.41 Let ￿(￿) = ￿ + ￿, representing the weight on
the other person￿ s payo⁄ if a2 < a1. It￿ s easy to check that u(￿;￿) is strictly
increasing in person 1￿ s material payo⁄ a1 if and only ￿(￿) < 1, and strictly
decreasing if the opposite strict inequality holds. In this example, a cardi-
nalization is a pair of utility functions u = (us;uo) both us and uo are in the
family de￿ned by (3). In particular, us(￿) = u(￿;￿s) and ￿s = (￿s;￿s) satis￿es
￿(￿s) < 1. Similarly, uo(￿) = u(￿;￿o) and ￿o = (￿o;￿o) satis￿es ￿(￿o) > 1.
Suppose that we observe the choice function c, and c is the instance of
second-place choice in our motivating example in section 2.2. Consider the
change in opportunities A = fx;y;zg to A0 = fx;yg. Our dual-system do-
main restriction implies that ￿xy = f￿sg and ￿yx = f￿og: Thus, L(x;y;u) =
l(x;y;u). After some algebra, it￿ s easy to check that L(x;y;u) =
￿(￿o;￿o)￿1
1￿￿(￿s;￿s)
and ￿min(x;y;c;V ) = 1.42 Hence, condition (i) of the Theorem reduces to
￿(￿s)
2
+
￿(￿o)
2
< 1 (4)
The cardinalizations that insure that the change from A to A0 is bene￿cial
are precisely those satisfying (4). Intuitively, this condition states that the
weight on the other person￿ s payo⁄, on average, over the motivations that
41This implies ￿ ￿ 1 + ￿:
42Observe that u(x;￿) = 1 and u(y;￿) = 3
4 +
￿(￿;￿)
4 , so W(y;￿) = 3
4 +
￿s￿(￿s;￿s)+(1￿￿s)￿(￿o;￿o)
4 which decreases with ￿s. In this example, the smallest value
of ￿s for an explanatory population is ￿s = 1=2.
31are part of an explanation of c, must be small compared to the weight given
to your own individual payo⁄ at this explanation.43
5.2 Choice Evidence and Welfare Improvements
Our next result show that the bounds based on our family of welfare func-
tionals satisfy a form of monotonicity with respect to choice evidence. The
results con￿rm a natural intuition: If we have a choice function e c that shows
"stronger choice evidence of x over y" than another choice function e c, an an-
alyst who reaches the conclusion that x is welfare-preferred to y for individ-
uals who exhibit behavior c should reach the same conclusion for individuals
who exhibit the behavior c. We start by making precise what we mean by
"stronger choice evidence".
De￿nition 6 (Strength of Evidence) Fix a pair of alternatives x;y 2 X.
The choice function e c is said to display stronger choice evidence for x over
y than choice function c if there exists a partition fA0;Axyg of the domain
A such that
(i) For each A 2 A0 we have that e c(A) = c(A) and
(ii) For each A 2 Axy we have that fx;yg ￿ A0; e c(A) = x and c(A) = y
Intuitively, starting from c we can obtain a choice function that displays
stronger evidence for x over y by changing the choice from y to x in any subset
in which both x and y are available and c(A) = y. The "choice evidence of y
over x" is reversed on this set. For example, with three alternatives x;y; and
z, start form the choice function c that is "seemingly rational" and consistent
with the preference ￿ = yxz. We obtain two choice functions that display
stronger evidence for x over y by either switching either the choice from the
pair fx;yg or the choice from the triple fx;y;zg from y to x. Both of these
induced choice functions are instances of second-place choice. If we were to
switch the choice to x at both of these subsets we obtain the "seemingly
rational" choice function e c consistent with the preference ￿ = yxz. The
latter choice function displays stronger evidence in for x over y than c, and is
43In practice the policy-maker may try to extract more information about the cardinal-
ization by surveying a population or conducting other experiments that try estimate the
relative weight of own versus other￿ s people material preferences. Thus, the method iden-
ti￿es the "burden of proof" for an analyst who needs to asses whether or not x improves
welfare upon y across all the explanations consistent with choice.
32also stronger than either of the two functions obtained with a with a single
switch.
Theorem 3 If e c displays stronger evidence for x over y than c and u is a car-
dinalization for which ￿W min(A0;A;c;u;V ) ￿ 0 then ￿W min(A0;A;e c;u;V ) ￿
0.
A proof is in the Appendix and it relies exclusively on the monotonicity
of both the welfare measure and the choice aggregator. The result can be
motivated by considering the following thought experiment in the context of
our retirement funds example. A policy maker is interested in evaluating a
change from the existing riskless and low return portfolio system y to one that
makes the intermediate risk and return portfolio x available. Let e c be the the
seemingly rational choice function consistent with the preference ￿ = xyz.
Suppose that c is the instance of second-place choice such that, for pairs, x is
always chosen whenever available but y is chosen from the triple. Clearly, e c
displays stronger choice evidence for x over y than c. Suppose that the policy
maker has determined using some method - axioms, surveys, or any other
measurement- that an individual displaying behavior c will be satis￿ed with
the change in opportunities. Then, holding welfare information ￿xed (i.e.,
for the same U), the policy maker must also conclude that the same welfare
conclusion holds for individuals that behave according to e c. The desirability
of a change in opportunities satis￿es a monotone comparative statics property
with respect to choice evidence. The result imposes discipline on welfare
assessments by a policy maker based on choice information alone.
Some additional remarks are in place:
1. The theorem implies that the stronger the choice evidence for an al-
ternative x over another alternative y, the coarser is the non-choice
information required by the analyst to conclude that x is welfare pre-
ferred to y. In particular, it identi￿es the burden of proof for an analyst
or policy who wants to build the case that x is better than y: if c and e c
are observed for di⁄erent groups of individuals and c has weaker choice
evidence of "x over y" e c, the analyst must provide welfare evidence "x
over y" for those with behavior c:
2. A stronger version of the result holds. In the Appendix we show that,
under same hypothesis, ￿W min(A0;A;e c;u;V ) ￿ ￿W min(A0;A;c;u;V ).
33The latter can be used to compare the compensation required to en-
sure that a change of opportunities is bene￿cial as the choice function
observed by the analyst varies. Under some reasonable assumptions,
stronger choice evidence for the "new" outcome is associated with lower
bounds on the compensatory variation.44
6 Conclusion
We modeled potentially non-rational choice as a con￿ ict between simultane-
ously held motivations with possibly di⁄erent strengths. The task of eco-
nomic analysis is to determine which con￿ icting preferences could give rise
to the observed choice function. Once these preferences are known, welfare
analysis can use them to evaluate the e¢ cacy of any given change in the set
of alternatives that is available. We have given a general framework under
which this program can be carried out.
Our model shows that all choice patterns are in fact possible as the result
of the aggregation of con￿ icting motivations by rules that satisfy an intuitive
monotonicity requirement. We also show that a priori restrictions of the
set of motivations or aggregation rules can reduce the patterns of behavior
explained by the theory.
We introduced an ordinal welfare method based on the selection of ex-
planations that are non-con￿ icted with respect to a change in the choice
associated to a changes in opportunities. We argued that this is a natural
extension of traditional revealed preference inferences and identi￿ed a lim-
ited consistency condition on choices -pairwise coherence- that fully identi￿es
these situations. This method is limited by the consistency of choice.
A second method that allows for a divergence between welfare and the
consistency of behavior was also presented. The method is also based on the
set of explanatory preferences that arise from our theory and requires the an-
alyst to use both choice and non-choice information. Our central conclusion
is that, even though non-choice evidence might be required to make welfare
inferences, the strength of choice evidence imposes discipline on the nature
of welfare inferences.
In future work we will try to look for principled re￿nements under which
some explanations can be selected. The aim in all these endeavors will be to
44In the on-line Appendix we provide a natural de￿nition of compensatory variation in
this framework and provide a formal statement of this result.
34provide sharper welfare inferences than those available from the method in
the present paper alone. Exploring the positive and normative implications
of the framework in economic environments that present natural domain
restrictions such as consumer theory also remains for future research.
35A Axiomatization of Monotonic Voting Rules
Given a 2 X and ￿ 2 ￿, let M(a;￿) ￿ ￿ be the set of preferences that any
￿ 2 M(a;￿) (i) preserves the same ranking of ￿ for alternatives in Xnfag
and (ii) ranks a strictly better than ￿. Fix an arbitrary population ￿ 2 ￿￿
and consider any transformation ￿ of the original distribution ￿ such that,
for each ￿ with ￿(￿) > 0, the weight ￿(￿) is distributed across preferences in
M(a;￿). This a "monotonic transformation of ￿ with respect to a" because
it shifts mass from ￿ to preferences that rank a higher while preserving the
order of other alternatives. The set of such transformations is M(a;￿).
Each v 2 V m satis￿es the following axioms:
Axiom (A1) (Monotonicity) If a 2 v(A;￿) then a 2 v(A;￿) for all ￿ 2
M(a;￿).
Axiom (A2) (Continuity) If d(v;￿) is upper hemi-continuous in ￿:
Axiom (A3) (Neutrality) Let ￿ : X ! X be any permutation of alterna-
tives and q￿ : ￿ ! ￿ be the permutation induced by ￿ on orderings
of X (￿(a)q￿(￿)￿(b) , a￿b). If ￿ and e ￿ are two distribution of voters
such that e ￿(q￿(￿)) = ￿(￿) then d(v;￿)(A) = d(v;e ￿)(A).
B Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose that c is pairwise coherent with respect to (x;y). We establish
the result by constructing a family of explanations based on the plurality rule,
i.e., a linear rule such that the score of a 2 A is gA(a;￿) =
P
gA(a;￿)￿(￿)
and gA(a;￿) = 1 if a is the maximizer of ￿ on A and gA(a;￿) = 0 otherwise.
The explanatory populations we construct have support ￿xy = f￿ 2 ￿jx￿y
and @a such that x￿a￿yg, i.e., the preferences that rank x over y and have
no alternatives ranked between x and y.
We start by introducing some notation. Let x = 2 X be an auxiliary
alternative that replaces x and/or y in each subset that originally contained
one or both of these. To be precise, let X = Xnfxg and consider map
s : X ! X
s(a) =
￿
a if a = 2 fx;yg
x if a 2 fx;yg:
36For each A 2 A, s(A) denotes the image of A under s. Observe that s(A) = A
if A does not contain either x or y and, otherwise, s(A) = Anfx;yg [ fxg.
Let A be denote the collection of subsets of X of two or more elements, ￿
be the set of orderings over X, and ￿￿ be the simplex of populations on ￿.
Next, we introduce an auxiliary choice function c￿ de￿ned on the "re-
duced" domain A rather than A. For each set T that does not contain either
x or y, let
Q(T;c) = fc(T [ fxg);c(T [ fyg);c(T [ fx;yg)g and
Q
s(T;c) = s(Q(T;c)):
Hence, Q(T;c) is the set of choices under c for subsets that add x;y; or both
to T and Qs(T;c) is the image of this set under s. Observe that that the
image of T [ J for each non-empty J ￿ fx;yg under s is always T [ fxg.
Consider the choice function c￿ : A ! A de￿ned by
c
￿(A) =
￿
c(A) if x = 2 A
Qs(Anfxg;c) if x 2 A:
(5)
The choice function c￿ reproduces c for choice instances that do not contain
x and imposes a tie for alternatives in Qs(Anfxg;c) if x 2 A. Note that
Qs(Anfxg;c) is a singleton if c is independent with respect to fx;yg.
For any ￿
￿ 2 ￿￿ that explains c￿, we construct and an explanation of
c with the desired property. For this purpose, we introduce the one-to-one
map k : ￿ ! ￿xy that assigns to each preference pro￿le ￿ 2 ￿ the ranking
￿ = k(￿) 2 ￿xy satisfying a ￿ x ) a￿x and x ￿ a ) y￿a. That is, the order
k(￿) is such that alternatives x and y are inserted as a stack in place of x
respecting order ￿. Let K : ￿￿ ! ￿￿ be the map de￿ned by ￿ = K(￿) if
￿(k(￿)) = ￿(￿). By construction, K(￿) 2 ￿xy for any ￿. We claim that if
￿
￿ explains c￿ then K(￿
￿) explains c. The claim is shown in two steps:
Step 1: If ￿ = K(￿), a = s(a), and A = s(A) then
gA(a;￿) =
￿
b gA(a;￿) if fx;yg   A or a 6= y
0 if a = y, fx;yg ￿ A;
(6)
where gA(a;￿) is the Plurality score of a from alternatives in A ￿ X and
￿ 2 ￿￿, and b gA(a;￿) is the Plurality score of a from alternatives in A ￿ X
and ￿ 2 ￿￿.
37Indeed, we can express A as a union of disjoint sets A = T [ J, where
T = Anfx;yg and J is either a non-empty subset of fx;yg or J = ;. If J = ;,
so that A = A, the ranking of alternatives in A under k(￿) is the same as the
ranking of alternatives in A under ￿ (for any ￿). Instead, if J = fzg with
z 2 fx;yg, the ranking of alternatives in A under k(￿) is the same than the
ranking of alternatives in A = T [fxg under ￿ replacing z for x (for any ￿).
Thus, gA(a;￿) = b gA(a;￿) if fx;yg   A.
Finally, consider the case J = fx;yg, so that A = AnJ [ fxg. Since x is
ranked better than y by k(￿) for any ￿ 2 ￿, y is not ranked ￿rst in A by
any motivation in the support of ￿. Thus, for Plurality, gA(y;￿) = 0. On
the other hand, if a is ranked ￿rst in A by k(￿) then a = s(a) is ranked ￿rst
in A by ￿. Hence, gA(a;￿) = b gA(a;￿) for a 6= y.
Step 2: If A does not contain either x or y, s de￿ned on A is the identity
and, from (6), there is also a one-to-one correspondence between the scores
of K(￿
￿) for alternatives in A and the scores of ￿
￿ alternatives in s(A).
Further c(A) = c￿(A). Since ￿
￿ explains c￿, b gA(c￿(A);￿
￿) > b gA(a;￿
￿) for each
a 6= c￿(A), from which gA(c(A);K(￿
￿)) > gA(a;K(￿
￿)) for each a 6= c(A).
Consider the case either x or y are in A, so that A = s(A) contains x.
If A contains only one of these alternatives then, from (5) and (6), it is
straightforward to verify that the scores of alternatives in A \ Q(Anfxg;c)
are equal to each other and greater than the score of any other alternative in
A. Since c(A) 2 Q(Anfxg;c), we have that gA(c(A);K(￿
￿)) ￿ gA(a;K(￿
￿))
for each a 6= c(A). Finally, if fx;yg ￿ A, the previous holds replacing
Q(Anfxg;c) with Q(Anfxg;c)nfyg. We conclude that K(￿
￿) 2 E(c). ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. See Green and Hojman (2007).
Proof of Theorem 3
The Theoremfollows directly from Lemmas 1 and 2 below. Let ￿W(x;y;￿;u) =
W u(x;￿) ￿ W u(y;￿) and ￿W min(x;y;c;u;v) = min￿2E(c;v) ￿W(x;y;￿;u).
Lemma 1 Fix v 2 V m. If e c exhibits stronger evidence of x over y than c
then ￿W min(x;y;e c;u;v) ￿ ￿W min(x;y;c;u;v).
Proof. We start by noting that, if e c exhibits stronger evidence of x over
y than c then there exists a collection of choice functions c1;c2;:::;cn where
c1 = c; c2 = e c and ci and ci+1 coincide on all of the domain except for a single
choice-set B where ci(B) = y and ci(B) = x. Thus, it su¢ ces to prove the
38result for two choice functions c and e c that di⁄er at a single "disagreement"
choice-set B.
Throughout the proof the alternatives x;y 2 X and the cardinalization
u are ￿xed. For ease of notation, write ￿W min(v;c) for ￿W min(x;y;c;u;v).
De￿ne fu : ￿ ! R as
f
u(￿) ￿ W
u(x;￿) ￿ W
u(y;￿),
i.e., the cardinal welfare di⁄erence under between x and y for a given popu-
lation ￿. (Once again, we omit the dependency of fu on x;y). Note that
￿W
min(c;v) = min
￿2E(c;v)
f
u(￿): (7)
Also, the function fu is linear in ￿ as
f
u(￿) = d
T
u￿
where du 2 R￿ is the vector of utility di⁄erences with components du￿ ￿
u(x;￿) ￿ u(y;￿). We later use the fact that that
du￿ > 0 if x￿y and du￿ < 0 if y￿x: (8)
Let K = E(c;v)\E(e c;v) denote the boundary between the set of explanatory
populations of c and e c. The argument is based on the fact that the "objective
function" fu of the program (7) increases as we move from any point in the
boundary K away from E(c;v), as shown below.
Since K ￿ E(c;V ), we have that
￿W
min(c;v) ￿ ￿W
min(K;v) ￿ minff
u(￿)j￿ 2 Kg: (9)
Let gB be the choice-set dependent scoring function for the rule v when the set
of available alternatives is the disagreement set B. Note that any population
￿ 2 K satis￿es the equality ￿B(￿) ￿ gB(x;￿) ￿ gB(y;￿) = 0 (indi⁄erence
between x and y at B). Note also, that any ￿ 2 E(e c;v)nK has ￿B(￿) > 0.
From property (M3) in section 3, for any ￿,
@￿B
@￿
(￿) ￿ 0 for x￿y and
@￿B
@￿
￿ 0 for y￿x,
where the inequality is strict at least for those motivations that rank x and
y ￿rst. Combining this with (8), we have that r￿
T
Bdu > 0. It follows that
39the objective function fu increases locally as we move from any population
in the boundary ￿ 2 K into the region where ￿B(￿) > 0 in the direction of
r￿
T
B(￿). By the linearity of fu, we conclude that the minimum value of fu
on E(e c;v), ￿W min(v;e c), is weakly greater than ￿W min(K;v). Combining
this with (9), we have that ￿W min(c;v) ￿ ￿W min(K;v) ￿ ￿W min(e c;v).
Lemma 2 Fix M 2 R. Suppose that e c exhibits stronger evidence of x over y
than c: If ￿W min(x;y;c;u;V ) ￿ M we have that ￿W min(x;y;e c;u;V ) ￿ M:
Proof. Since E(c;V ) = [v2VE(c;v), we have that ￿W(x;y;￿;u) ￿ M for
all ￿ 2 E(c;V ) will be satis￿ed if and only if
for each v 2 V , ￿W(x;y;￿;u) ￿ M for all ￿ 2 E(c;v)
or, equivalently,
for each v 2 V , ￿W
min(x;y;c;u;v) ￿ M:
Let c and e c be as in the hypothesis and suppose that ￿W min(x;y;c;u;V ) ￿
M. From above, this means that for each v 2 V , ￿W min(x;y;c;u;v) ￿ M:
From Lemma 1, we conclude that ￿W min(x;y;e c;u;v) ￿ M for each v 2 V .
The conclusion follows.
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